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Protecting Reliance
Victor P. Goldberg
Reliance-talk permeates contract law and scholarship. One party relies on the
other’s promised performance, or its statements, or its anticipated entry into a formal
agreement. Often it is paired with justice (or, more precisely, avoiding injustice) for
defining obligations or reckoning compensation. It is the centerpiece of the Fuller-Perdue
triumvirate of interests to protect.1 Reliance, they argued persuasively, is tremendously
important. And many scholars were persuaded. It is one of the most cited articles in
contract law. Saying that reliance is important, however, says nothing about what we
should do about it. The leap from that proposition to implications for doctrine—a leap
made by Fuller-Perdue and many followers—does not follow.2 The Fuller-Perdue
framework does nothing to resolve the Goldilocks problem: is the protection of reliance
too much, too little, or just right?
Too often court decisions or scholarship forward arguments of this form: people want
to be able to rely upon X and if the law does not take that reliance into account then
something bad (inefficiency for some, injustice for others) will occur. Principles of
contract doctrine can then be invoked, rejiggered, or even amended, so that the reliance is
properly accounted for. The discussion, I believe, typically fails to ask the most basic
questions: what do parties do and why do they do it? My focus will be on these contract
design questions. Understanding how and why parties deal with reliance questions will
provide insights both into contract doctrine and interpretation.
Contract law allows parties, within constraints, to set their own rules. It
provides a set of default rules and if the parties do not like them, they can change
them. Some of the rules, however, are mandatory, and others are, to varying degrees,
sticky. That stickiness is in part due to the costs of tailoring a transaction. For
example, in many B2B transactions, including million dollar deals, the
documentation consists of conflicting language on the back of two printed forms.
Apparently in such cases the parties would rather rely on the default rule for
resolving the conflicting language than to spell out their obligations in a negotiated
document.3

1

See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
2
For criticisms of the Fuller-Perdue argument for awarding reliance damages, see
Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 92, 111 (2000);
Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest In Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1755 (1992).
3On the costs and benefits of providing specific terms at the front end versus having
a third party determine the content of the agreement at the back end, see Robert E.
Scott and George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J.
814 (2006).
2
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A more subtle source of stickiness is the beliefs of judges, scholars, and
lawyers about the nature of contracts and contractual duties. The notion that
victims of a breach of contract should be made whole is a powerful one that
constrains the ability of parties to structure their relationship.4 There is a huge
literature on the philosophy of contract law morality. 5 I do not intend to engage
with it directly. I do hope that by focusing on the question of contract design I can
nudge contractual ethos and contract doctrine in a direction that is more congenial
to the needs of the parties.
My concern, I must emphasize, is with the contracts of sophisticated parties. I am
not concerned with consumer contracts or agreements between amateurs—for example,
uncle’s promise of cash to pay for nephew’s car, which was featured in the debate over
the adoption of Section 90. There can, of course, be some dispute over whether a
particular contract falls in that category. For my purposes, the category is defined by
agreements for which both parties could be expected to have access to counsel. (I include
also the battle of the forms, alluded to above, even though its essential feature is that the
parties are not expected to involve counsel in the actual transaction.)
Contract performance takes place over time and the nature of the parties’ future
obligations can be deferred to take account of changing circumstances. Reliance matters
in this context since one or both of the parties might want to rely on the continuity of the
arrangement; but they might also want the flexibility to adapt as new information
becomes available. If the two parties were under single ownership, the owner could
determine the appropriate tradeoff between flexibility and reliance. If they are not, the
coordination is done by contract and the contract will define the tradeoff. The contract, as
is often the case, might give one party the discretion to adapt to the new information, and
it would convey to that party the counterparty’s reliance, the cost to it of granting that
discretion. In effect, one party sells discretion (or flexibility) to the other. The “price”
would reflect the value of flexibility to one party and the cost of providing that flexibility
to the other. The price need not be explicit. As some of the illustrations below will
demonstrate, the contract structure can determine an implicit price of flexibility.
The flexibility‐reliance tradeoff will be considered in Section I. It could take
the form of allowing one party to terminate the agreement—essentially giving it an
option to abandon. Breach is, of course, a special case of the option to terminate.
Once this is recognized it is clear that the price of that option need bear no
relationship to the traditional remedies for breach. Or the tradeoff could take the
Scott & Triantis stress both the importance of the compensation principle in
contract law and its dubious foundations. See Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis,
Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104
COLUMBIA L. R. 1428 (2004).
5
See, for example, Richard Craswell, Promises and Prices, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV., 735
(2012); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE
TO EACH OTHER (1998). See generally Symposium, Contract as Promise at 30: The
Future of Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV., 602 (2012).
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lesser form of, say, giving one party control of the quantity decision. Both of these
manifestations of the tradeoff will be explored in Section I.
If one party relies on the other party to perform competently and the
counterparty fails to do so, the consequences can be severe. If I ship a package and it
fails to arrive, I, or the intended recipient, might suffer consequential damages. Since
Hadley v. Baxendale was decided, the aggrieved party’s ability to obtain
compensation for its resultant losses has been limited. In Section II, the rationale for
restricting the recovery of consequential damages will be considered with a
particular emphasis on the role of reasonable reliance.
When performance of a contract is excused (by impossibility or related
doctrines) the parties are left in the middle. A buyer might have already paid
thousands of dollars for goods that it will not receive because the seller was excused.
The seller might have spent substantial sums in reliance upon the contract before
the occurrence of an event that excused performance. Must the seller disgorge the
payments it has received? Should the seller be compensated for expenses made in
reliance upon the contract? The Restatement (Second) says Yes to the first
question; to the second it would compensate for reliance to avoid injustice. English
law yields a similar result.6 This is, I suggest in Section III, a doctrine untethered by
reality. Parties routinely design around the doctrine.
Reliance, coupled with the prevention of injustice shows up in other corners
of contract doctrine as well. It has been the basis for finding a promise enforceable
(Section 90) and an offer irrevocable (Section 87(2)). The intellectual rise of
promissory estoppel and its practical significance (or lack thereof) has been
chronicled elsewhere and I have little to add to that.7 The original source of the
irrevocability argument is Judge Traynor’s famous decision in Drennan v. Star
Paving,8 which involved an offer by a subcontractor to a general contractor. The
practical significance in contexts other than contracts between general contractors
and subcontractors in public projects is minimal. In the few cases in which the issue
has been litigated, the courts have shown little consistency in identifying the type of
reliance that would trigger irrevocability. In Section IV both the reliance trigger and
the factors affecting the need to protect the reliance of both the GC and the sub will
be considered.
In sales contracts, particularly those involving complex transactions (e.g.,
corporate acquisitions), information about the asset will be imperfect. Often, the
most efficient producer of some types of information will be the seller. The seller
6

See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40; Fibrosa Spolka
Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., [1943] A.C. 32 at 49-50 (H.L. 1942).
7
See e.g., Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine,
78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the
Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009).
8
51 Cal. 2d 409 (1958).
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wants the buyer to rely on the information. The greater the assurance, the more a
buyer would be willing to pay. The seller, therefore, has an incentive to provide
information, perhaps in the form of a warranty. However, the seller also wants to
demarcate on which information buyers should rely, and, of equal importance, on
which information it should not have relied. Section V will explore some issues
concerning reliance and information: anti‐reliance clauses; breach of warranty; and
“sandbagging.” Section VI concludes.
I. Reliance and Flexibility
A. The Option to Abandon
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said that the “duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it--and
nothing else.”9 The notion that a contract is merely an option to perform or pay damages
has elicited much criticism.10 A common refrain in both decisions and scholarship is that
parties plan for performance, not the option to terminate.11 That may be true for the
parties, but it is not true for their counsel. For many transactions it would amount to
malpractice to ignore the possibility that one or the other party might choose to walk
away from the deal. In contracts that are expected to take place over time, there is a
tradeoff between flexibility and reliance. On the one hand, the parties want to adapt as
new information becomes available. But on the other hand, if one party has relied on the
continuation of the relationship, adapting to that new information might cause it
considerable harm.
When circumstances change, sometimes the most efficacious response is to
terminate the contract. One party might have an option to terminate while the
counterparty might want to restrict that option to protect its reliance by requiring payment.
The exercise price for the option to terminate need not have any relationship to the legal
remedies of the UCC or Restatement. In the contracts literature, the notion of “efficient
breach” has been controversial.12 Framed differently, it becomes the more benign
“reasonable termination.” The manner in which reliance affects the exercise price of the
termination option varies depending on the context. Consider the following illustrations.
9

O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
See e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) (arguing that a contract is a
promise which the promisor has a moral duty to perform).
11
“Parties generally have their minds addressed to the performance of contracts—
not to their breach or the consequences which will follow a breach.” Williston,
Contracts, Sec 1357 (1920)
12
See e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 975
(2005); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Ian
R. Macneil, Efficient Breach Of Contract: Circles In The Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947
(1982); Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2000).
10
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1. Venture capital
Consider first the venture capital contract.13 The venture capitalist (VC) provides
funds to an entrepreneur whose project typically has a high risk of failure and, even if
successful, a long period before it will yield positive returns. The VC does not commit to
funding the entire project. Instead, it will phase payment, allowing it to terminate its
obligation as new information on the likely success of the project becomes available. It
pays for this option up front in the share price. The option to abandon is generally
accompanied with a right of first refusal. If the entrepreneur found an alternative supplier
of funds, the VC would have the right to continue funding on the same terms proposed by
the third party. The option to terminate—to not throw good money after bad—is valuable
to the VC. But it is costly to the entrepreneur who would be sitting with a non-completed
project and no viable funding source to complete it. It would be especially vulnerable
were the VC to use the option to rewrite the deal on more favorable terms. That is, when
the option to abandon is triggered, the VC could say that it would only fund the next
round if the terms were altered in its favor. So, what protection of the entrepreneur’s
reliance would the contract exhibit? In virtually all venture capital deals the answer
would be that the VC would pay nothing at the time the option is exercised. All the
entrepreneur has is a nonenforceable understanding that if the business performs as
expected, the VC will invest in another round. The entrepreneur’s protection of its
reliance would take two forms. First, is the VC’s self-interest; if the information
produced has been positive, it will be in the VC’s interest to proceed. Delay or
abandonment hurts it. Second, if the VC’s threat to terminate is perceived as an
opportunistic attempt to renegotiate, its reputation will take a hit. For present purposes,
the key point is that although the entrepreneur relies on the VC’s future funding, it would
rarely, if ever, receive compensation if the VC were to exercise the termination option.
2. Pay-or-play
Next, consider a movie studio contracting with an actor to appear in a movie to be
filmed in the near future (say, six months later).14 A lot can happen in the intervening
period. The script might be disappointing; the genre might become less attractive; a
similar film might be released; a director incompatible with the actor might be signed on;
a more attractive actor might become available; the actor’s reputation might be tarnished
in the interim; and so forth. As the primary claimant on the project’s earnings, the studio
has the incentive to make adaptive decisions that enhance the expected value of the
project. The right to terminate the actor before filming commences would be valuable to
the studio. The actor enters into the contract in reliance on the project going forward and
on her being in the film. Her reliance is the opportunity cost of accepting this project and
foregoing other possible offers that might come along in the intervening months. The
studio’s flexibility and the actor’s reliance are protected by a pay-or-play clause. The
13

See e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003).
14
See VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW, ch. 15, at 279-309 (2006).
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studio maintains the right not to make the movie and, if it does choose to make the movie,
to do so without this actor. The price of this option depends on the marketability of the
actor. For a major talent the pay-or-play option would kick in upon entering into the
contract and the compensation would be the so-called fixed fee.15 For lesser talent, the
option might not be triggered until a subsequent event—perhaps the appearance of a bona
fide alternative offer for the actor. Until that point, the actor would be committed to the
project, but the studio would have a free option to terminate.
The pay-or-play clause is a variation on a severance package (except the actor is
not an employee). An employment agreement might give the employer the discretion to
terminate the agreement at its convenience (“no cause”) and, if so, it might specify what
compensation, if any, would be required. The structure of these contracts can vary in
subtle ways. Consider, for example, the multi-year contracts of two coaches in major
college sports programs: John Calipari at Kentucky and Rich Rodriguez, then at West
Virginia.16 The coach and the university both have a substantial reliance interest in the
relationship. If either chose to terminate without cause, it would have to bear some
consequence, but both want to retain that option. The two contracts chose a somewhat
different way to protect reliance. If Kentucky terminated Calipari it would pay liquidated
damages of $3 million per year for each remaining year on the contract.17 Calipari would
be required to “make reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain employment.” If he were
to succeed, then the damages would be “reduced by the amount of the minimum
guaranteed annual compensation package of the Coach’s new position.”18 That is, he
would have a duty to mitigate and there would be a partial offset. If, on the other hand,
Calipari chose to terminate early, he would owe as liquidated damages an amount that
decreased over time--$3 million if the termination were in the first year, declining to
$500,000 in the fourth year and nothing in year five. The Rodriguez arrangement was
simpler. If either he or the school terminated without cause, there would be a one-time

15

Major talent typically receive a percentage of the gross offset against a fixed fee. The
fee might be in the $20 million range. If the share of the gross were 10%, the gross would
have to reach $200 million before the contingent compensation would kick in. For more
detail on contingent compensation in the movie business, see GOLDBERG, supra note 14,
ch. 1, at 13-42.
16
Copies of both contracts available from the author.
17
Calipari’s base salary was only $400,000. However, his compensation also included a
broadcast endorsement payment of around $3 million per year. The contract included
incentive payments based on the athletic and classroom performance of his team. If
Kentucky won the SEC and national championship the incentive payment would be an
additional $750,000. If the basketball team achieved a 75% graduation rate he would
receive an additional $50,000. Since most of his stars are one-and-done, he seemed quite
willing to sacrifice this piece of the compensation.
18
If the new contract were structured in the same way, it appears that this would only
refer to the base compensation—about $400,000, even though the contract would likely
pay out over $3 million per year.
7

payment of $2 million. Rodriguez would neither have to mitigate nor offset any
earnings.19
The point of these examples is that the option to terminate the agreement can
create value, and the price of that option reflects the counterparty’s reliance. I say
“reflects,” since, as the VC example shows, there can be considerable reliance (the
entrepreneur is desperate for the next tranche of funding) but little or no compensation if
the option were to be exercised. The entrepreneur’s protection lies elsewhere.
3. Reliance on Illusory Promises
In some instances the reliance-flexibility tradeoff can be accomplished despite the
parties deliberately making their agreement legally unenforceable. That is, one party
might be encouraged to make investments in reliance on the continuation of its
relationship notwithstanding the fact that it would have no legal recourse were the other
party to terminate. If a contract said in effect, I will do it if I want to, it would be deemed
illusory and lacking consideration. For example, the standard franchise agreement
between Ford and its dealerships pre-1940 took this form. The non-enforceability was not
an accident of careless drafting. Ford knew what it was doing.20 Ford had only promised
to fill future orders if it chose to do so.21 In Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor
Co.22 the court found the agreement to be illusory, despite the claimed reliance of the
dealer on alleged oral statements by Ford representatives:
defendant's settled policy was ‘Once a Ford dealer, always a Ford dealer‘;
that by the dealership contract ‘the plaintiff had become a member of the
great Ford family; that the plaintiff would remain a Ford dealer as long as
it wanted to;’ that the Ford policy, settled for many years, ‘was a
guarantee of this; and that the plaintiff need have no hesitation whatever in

19

In a typical pay-or-play contract the talent would have no duty to mitigate, but would
have to offset any earnings. That is explicit in the union contract of the Director’s Guild:
If the director is employed by a third party, the employer “shall be entitled to an offset of
the compensation arising from such new employment for such remaining portion of the
guaranteed period against the compensation remaining unpaid. . . . [However,] the
Director shall have no obligation to mitigate damages arising from his or her removal. . .
.” (THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW, § 27.10, at 34 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing the 1990 DGA Basic Agreement §6-105)).
20
See Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 Yale Law Journal 1135, 1151 (1957).
21
“The Sales Agreement, by its term Article (9)(c) was terminable at any time, at the will
of either party, and does not bind defendant to sell or deliver, or plaintiff to buy, nor does
it impose any liability on defendant if it terminates or refuses to make sales to the other
party. The Sales Agreement was to be observed by the parties only so long as was
mutually satisfactory.” Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 30 F.Supp. 917,
920-921 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
22
116 F.2d 675 (2d. Cir. 1940).
8

investing all available funds in the promotion of the sale and servicing of
Ford products as such investments would be perfectly safe.’ . . . plaintiff
was encouraged to enlarge its facilities, increase its sales force and expand
its business, in reliance on the assurances given by the defendant that
plaintiff was 'in’ as a Ford dealer as long as it wanted and should have no
concern over the wisdom of making long term commitments and long
term plans.’23
Neither Chrysler nor General Motors went to the extreme of making the agreement
unenforceable. However, by making the agreement terminable on very short (say, fifteen
day) notice, they essentially accomplished the same thing.24 The agreements were
enforceable, but only for the brief period. The auto manufacturers wanted their dealers to
make investments in reliance on continuation of the relationship; and by and large dealers
did so. The dealers relied on the expectation that their satisfactory performance would
assure renewal of their franchise. Dealers wanted more but, absent legislative
intervention, they could not get the producers to give explicit protection to their
reliance.25
The General Motors-Fisher Body contract, subject of much academic interest,26
provides anther illustration. In 1919, the two entered into a ten-year agreement in which
Fisher agreed to produce and General Motors agreed to purchase almost all GM’s closed
automobile bodies. Despite the considerable reliance by both, the agreement was
unenforceable.27 While General Motors promised to place orders for substantially all its
bodies, Fisher only promised to tell GM whether it would accept the orders. It did not
promise that it would fulfill them.28 The reliance of each was protected in part by the
consequences if either walked away. Both would have suffered significant losses since
neither had an adequate alternative—the high switching costs, arguably, constrained the

23

Id., at 678.
See Ellis v. Dodge Bros., 246 F. 764, 765 (5th Cir. 1917) ( fifteen days' notice); Buick
Motor Co. v. Thompson, 75 S. E. 354, 355 (1912) (ten days' notice).
25
Since passage of the “Dealers Day in Court Act of 1956” automobile franchise
agreements that were not enforceable or were terminable on short notice have been
prohibited; see STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION
(1966).
26
For a partial listing of the literature, see generally, Victor Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at
the Wheel? The GM-Fisher Body Contract, 17 INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE, 1071 (2008)
(hereafter Asleep).
27
Id.
28
“In the event that the FISHER COMPANY accepts the orders specified in the
schedules from time to time furnished by GENERAL MOTORS, it shall proceed to make
and deliver the automobile bodies called for by said schedules. . .” quoted in Asleep,
emphasis added.
24
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parties and protected the reliance of each.29
Kellogg’s contract with a supplier of packaging material for its cereal provides
a more current illustration of a clearly unenforceable agreement.30 The contract was for
three years. The “quantity clause” such as it was, read as follows: “Kellogg generally
encourages its employees to obtain required goods and services from suppliers who have
entered into formal agreements with Kellogg, and Kellogg agrees to use reasonable
efforts to communicate the existence of this Agreement to such employees with a general
need to obtain the Products and Services within the scope of this Agreement.”31 Both
parties could terminate the Agreement with 120 days notice. While the agreement was,
obviously, too open-ended to be enforceable for any future orders, it would have been
enforceable for any orders that had already been executed. It, like the Fisher Body
contract and the Ford franchise contracts, was backward-enforceable, but not forwardenforceable. Nonetheless, it provided sufficient assurance to encourage the supplier’s
reliance on continuation of its dealings with Kellogg.
4. Preliminary Agreements
Reliance on preliminary agreements—letters of intent (LOI), memoranda of
understanding (MOU), and so forth—has been treated as both a rationale for enforcement
and a remedy. In TIAA v Tribune,32 Judge Leval stated: “Giving legal recognition to
preliminary binding commitments serves a valuable function in the marketplace,
particularly for relatively standardized transactions like loans. It permits borrowers
and lenders to make plans in reliance upon their preliminary agreements and
present market conditions.”33 He suggested that there were two types of enforceable
preliminary agreements. In Type I agreements, all the terms had been settled and only the
formality of signed the agreement was lacking. These agreements would be enforced as
contracts. His innovation was to recognize a lesser commitment. In Type II agreements, a
number of terms remained open so the agreement could not be enforced as such.
However, because the parties had relied upon the negotiations, he wrote, there was a
good faith obligation to attempt to negotiate the deal to completion. If a party breached
the good faith obligation it would be liable for damages. Tribune was one of a trilogy
involving TIAA. In the other two, the remedy was expectation damages. The Tribune
trial was only on the liability issue, with damages to be determined at a subsequent
proceeding. The case settled, but it is likely that the settlement reflected the expectation
damages—essentially the difference in the present value of the loan at the contract rate
and the market rate. In subsequent Type II cases most courts have restricted recovery to
reliance damages, following the reasoning of Alan Farnsworth: An “award based on [the
29

There is some question as to whether the executives of the firms were aware of the
non-enforceability of their agreement. It is not clear that the arrangement was sustainable;
the two firms were merged before the ten-year period expired.
30
Contract available from author.
31
Clause 1.7; emphasis added.
32
Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F.Supp. 491
(S.D.N.Y.1987).
33
See TIAA, 670 F.Supp. at 499.
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expectation interest] would give the injured party the ‘benefit of the bargain’ that was not
reached. But if no agreement was reached and . . . it cannot even be known what
agreement would have been reached, there is no way to measure the lost expectation.”34
With an MOU, parties need not fully commit to a project. They can defer their
decision by waiting until further information is revealed about the project and about their
prospective partner. Rather than negotiating an entire agreement, they can temporize with
one or both parties maintaining an option to terminate. For example, in the leading New
York case of Brown v Cara,35 a construction company (Brown) and property owner
(Cara) entered into a MOU in which the construction company would engage in an effort
to have the property rezoned. It would also get the construction contract and have partial
ownership of the project, but these terms were not spelled out. After the rezoning was
successful the parties could not come to an agreement and the property owner walked
away. The court held that this was a Type II agreement and that if the owner’s decision
were not in good faith, then it would have to pay reliance damages (Brown’s costs).
Brown spent considerable resources in pursuit of the rezoning, relying on its
expectation that it would do the construction and share in the ownership of the completed
project. Cara had the option to terminate, but the MOU did not set an option price. The
decision priced the option at Brown’s reliance damages—expenses incurred (adjusted for
the probability that a court might find the termination to be in good faith). But there were
plausible alternative ways of pricing Brown’s reliance. The MOU could have included a
non-binding clause, effectively pricing the option at zero. Or the option price could have
made Brown’s compensation contingent on the success of the deal. One device for doing
so is a buy/sell (or put/call) arrangement. If, after some defined milestone (perhaps
following the rezoning), either party wanted to go it alone, it could trigger a buy/sell
that would give its counterpart a choice. The offeror would name a price at which it
would be willing to either take full ownership of the property or sell out, and the
34

1 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.26a, at 314 (1982). Professor Eisenberg
argues that the remedy should be the full expectation interest. See Melvin Aaron
Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL LAW REV 1743, 1809
(2000). In SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc 2013 WL 2303303 (Del.Supr.)
the parties agreed that they” will negotiate in good faith with the intention of executing a
definitive License Agreement in accordance with the terms set forth in the License
Agreement Term Sheet.” After the value of the license increased dramatically, the
licensor regretted the terms and proposed much different terms in the subsequent
negotiations—more than doubling the royalty rate, for example. The court held that its
negotiating behavior was not in good faith and that had it behaved in good faith the
parties would have agreed to the terms in the Term Sheet. It then awarded expectation
damages—the projected stream of payments based on the terms in the Term Sheet.
35
420 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2005). For more detail on the case, see Victor P. Goldberg,
Brown v. Cara, the Type II Preliminary Agreement, and the Option to Unbundle,
presented at the Conference on Contractual Innovation, NYU Law School, May 3-4,
2012.
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offeree would choose. That would give both parties a piece of the upside, but would
still leave them with the flexibility to adapt as they learn information about the
project and about each other. All three methods of pricing the option are plausible.
My concern here is not with whether recognition of a Type II agreement is good
policy; rather, I want to illustrate how the option to abandon in the negotiating
phase can be valuable to one or both parties and that there are a wide variety of
plausible means for pricing that option. The price would reflect the ex ante reliance
concerns of the parties.
5. Remedies for Breach
If a contract does not explicitly allow for termination, what then? The default rule is
that termination would amount to a breach and the promisor would be liable for damages
(or specific performance). The preceding discussion of how parties protect their reliance
from the possibility that the counterparty might terminate the agreement has implications
for contract remedies. Importantly, these concern not only the reliance remedy, but the
expectation remedy. Specifically, I will argue that in many instances the “benefit of the
bargain” goes well beyond what sophisticated parties would (in fact do) choose.
Terminating an agreement is, of course, not the only way in which a contract can
be breached—I will consider another in the next Section. The starting point is that the
promisor has an option to terminate with the option price being the remedy for breach.
That framing has generated much criticism—indeed, hostility. Breach is immoral to some
and the amorality of the option notion grates. For a particularly forceful argument along
these lines, see Daniel Friedmann’s screed against the efficient breach concept.36
Friedmann treats a contract breach as a transgression against another’s rights and would
go beyond expectation damages. “[A] party is generally bound to perform his contractual
promises unless he obtains a release from the promisee.”37 The remedy should not be
damages, but specific performance. After pages of argument against allowing the
promisor to walk away, he takes almost all of it back:
As a normative matter, parties in a contractual setting should be left free
to define the ambit of their rights, and it is open to them to stipulate that the
promisor will be allowed to terminate the contract subject to the payment of
damages. The efficient breach theory assumes, however, that, even if they have
not done so and even if they intended to confer on the promisee a broader
entitlement, the law will nevertheless defeat their joint intention by granting the
promisor the option to breach.38
The parties should be free, that is, to choose what, if anything, should happen if one party
wanted to terminate. His entire attack is on a default rule and he appears quite content to
allow parties to contract out in any way they see fit. His argument boils down to the
notion that specific performance should be the default remedy, not expectation damages.
Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, J. Legal Stud. 1 (1989).
At 2.
38 At 23.
36
37
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Ironically, Scott & Triantis, taking the options framework, reach the same conclusion.39
Their rationale is quite different. Framing the question in terms of options makes it clear
that the option price need bear no relationship to the standard damage remedies of
contract law—expectation, reliance, or restitution. Rather than privileging any of the
three, Scott & Triantis recommend the “none of the above” alternative.
I regard the Scott & Triantis proposal as a form of academic shock treatment. The
expectation damages remedy is so firmly entrenched in the minds of judges, lawyers,
contracts professors, and even first-year students that a bold proposed change was
necessary to get their attention. The fundamental point is that the contract law remedy is,
in effect, the implied termination clause, and that it should be viewed as just another
contract term from which parties are free to vary. The remedy default rule, however, is
stickier than others. “Although most of contract law provides rules from which parties are
free to contract away, remedial defaults carry heavier presumptive weight than other
provisions.”40 Doctrinal limitations, notably the non-enforceability of penalty clauses,
present barriers to the proper pricing of the termination option.41
The stickiness of the expectation damage remedy is, as Scott & Triantis
observe, in part a historical accident, but it also has great rhetorical power. If a
breacher is perceived as having wronged the promisee, then corrective justice
would seem to require that, like a tort victim, the promisee should be made whole.
The standard refrain is that the contract remedy should put the promisee in as good
a position (financially) as if the contract had been performed. The promisee should
get the benefit of its bargain. That provides an anchor for doctrinal argument and friction
for moving away from the default remedies. In England, the presumption in favor of the
default contract remedies is, if anything, even stronger and the courts are very cautious
when interpreting language that might supplant those remedies.42 Reframing the
problem as a matter of transaction design and recognizing the reliance‐flexibility
tradeoff shows why the benefit of the bargain remedy is too simplistic. Holmes’s
framing as the promisor having a choice between performing or paying damages
was, in large part, a response to the notion that default rules should be derived from
ethical norms rather than commercial needs. Reviving Holmes’s aphorism would at
least nudge the rhetoric in a more useful direction In particular, the penalty doctrine could
be softened, if not abandoned entirely. And, I will argue below, in some contexts
awarding a seller lost profits would over-protect its reliance.
Much scholarship, particularly economic analyses of remedies, proceeds on the
implicit assumption that the parties are incapable of pricing termination themselves and
39

Robert E. Scott and George Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against
Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1486-88 (2004). Specific
performance is their default rule for contracts between sophisticated businesses. For
consumer contracts their default rule is to give the consumer a free option. (pp. 488-90)
40 Scott & Triantis, at 1435.
41 Find Farnsworth quote on why remedies are different.
42 Find cites in Treitel and chitty.
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that the policy options are limited to damages (expectation, reliance, restitution) or
specific performance. By framing the problem as one of pricing the termination option, it
is clear that in a wide variety of contexts the efficient rule (i.e., one which sophisticated
parties would voluntarily choose) bears no relation to the ones featured in the lawyer’s
rhetoric or the economists’ models. To be sure, there are classes of cases in which, a
default remedy of expectation damages would be efficient. I argue elsewhere that there is
a strong case for protecting the contract-market differential, which I have labeled the
narrow expectation interest,.43 But beyond that, there is little reason to believe that there
would be any relationship between the option price and the default remedies of law or the
remedies modeled by economists.
To illustrate the point, consider one context in which the expectation remedy does
a particularly poor job, the so-called “lost-volume-seller” problem. The rule is
memorialized in UCC 2-708(2) which elevates economic misunderstanding into a
statutory command: “If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done
then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which
the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer.” In the lost volume
cases, the contract and market price are the same, so if a buyer were to cancel an order
there would appear to be no damages. The claim is that the seller should be compensated
because he would have had the additional sale and his lost “profit” would be the
difference between the contract price and his “but for” costs. For a retailer that would be
the gross margin—the retail minus wholesale price. The retailing cases play a prominent
role in the literature and pedagogy with Neri v. Retail Marine being the case of choice. In
practice not so much. Since Neri was decided in 1972 there are only four recorded cases
involving claims by retailers against consumers. The retailer won in two cases (one for a
car and one for a boat) and lost two (one for a boat and one for a mobile home).44
If the buyer walked away and the dealer sold the boat at the same price, the rule
focuses on whether the seller would have sold another boat. If so, the seller has lost his
“profit” (the wholesale-retail differential) on the second boat and it would be entitled to a
damage award of the lost profits. The analysis gets more complicated when the seller’s
ability to sell the second boat is questioned. If the seller would not have been able to sell
another unit, perhaps because the supply was limited (it could not get another boat from
43

GOLDBERG, supra note 13, ch. 10 at 219-224. In a study of the use of reliance damages
in contracts under the UCC, Gibson found that courts rarely awarded reliance damages.
See Michael T. Gibson, Reliance Damages in the Law of Sales Under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 909, 915 (1997) (“Thus, in 467 of the cases
most likely to produce reliance damages, only fourteen (2.9%) did so.”).
44 Modern Marine v. Balski, 43411, 1981 WL 4969 (Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 1981) (boat,
seller wins); Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55 (Ohio Ct. App.,
Cuyahoga County 1983) (boat, buyer wins); Van Ness Motors, Inc. v. Vikram, 535 A.2d
510 (N.J. App. 1987) (car, seller wins); Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d
722 (Me. 1983) (mobile home, buyer wins).
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the manufacturer, perhaps because this model was so attractive) then there would be no
damage. So goes the rule. When framed as setting an option price, the remedy makes no
sense.
When placing an order, the customer wants some flexibility (the option to change
her mind) and the seller wants some protection of its reliance on the order. The remedy
prices the option. For cars and boats, it would be in the 12-15% range. I agree to pay 15%
of the sale price for the option to buy the boat by paying the other 85%. Leaving aside the
question of whether any consumer would have any idea that she has made such a
commitment, we can ask whether an informed consumer would be willing to pay such an
option price. The UCC’s remedy overprotects the seller’s reliance which is, typically,
trivial. The dealer can take into account the likelihood that a certain percentage of his
orders will result in cancellations. The likelihood that a buyer will walk away is one of
the risks of doing business. It is predictable; more importantly, it can be influenced by the
seller’s decisions. In particular, the seller can set an explicit option price—say, a nonrefundable deposit. There is no reason to believe that the option price would be equal to
the lost-volume remedy. Indeed, the remedy would be perverse. If the market were weak,
the option price would likely be near zero; conversely, when the market is tight, the
option price would be higher. The remedy gets it backwards. When the market is tight
(say the manufacturer allocates only a set number of boats to the dealer), the seller would
not be able to sell an extra unit—the lost volume remedy would be zero. When the
market is slack, the remedy would be the full wholesale-retail margin.45
In the B2B context the disconnect between the remedy and function is even
greater. The aggrieved seller claims that had there been no breach it would have been
able to produce and sell all the other units anyway, so its loss would be the difference
between the contract price and the costs it would have incurred had it produced the units
the buyer refused to take. Costs not associated with production of these units—research
and development, advertising, marketing, most plant and equipment—would not be
count; they would be part of the lost profit. Lost profit, especially for high tech products
could therefore be a significant part of the contract price—for example, in Teradyne v
Teladyne,46 the lost profits amounted to about 75% of the contract price. The contract
created by the lost volume remedy has the buyer paying $75 for the option to purchase
the product for an additional $25. Such a deal makes little business sense, especially if
the seller has ample capacity to meet the needs of this buyer and others (which must be so
if the seller is indeed a lost volume seller). As in the retail context, the presumption
would be that the option price would be greater if the seller faced significant output
constraints—the remedy again gets it backward.
An interesting illustration is provided by Rodriguez v. Learjet, Inc,.47 The
contract for a new airplane included a series of progress payments; in the event that the
For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Goldberg, Framing, ch. 12. See also,
Scott & Triantis, at pp. 1482‐84.
46 Citation.
47 946 P.2d 1010 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
45
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buyer terminated, Learjet would keep the payments already made. The buyer terminated
shortly after entering into the agreement and sued for return of its initial payment of
$250,000., asserting that the payment was an unenforceable penalty clause. Learjet
defended by arguing that it was a lost volume seller and that it had the capacity to sell this
plane and another; it proved to the court’s satisfaction that it had suffered lost profits of
over $1.8 million. Therefore, the measly $250,000 was not a penalty and the court
enforced it. The value of getting approval of its progress payment schedule (a schedule of
option prices) apparently exceeded the one-time gain of $1.8 million.
The case illustrates one function of the lost volume profit remedy: enforcing
deposits. If the buyer were to sue for return of its prepayment, the seller’s claim for lost
profits would act as a deterrent.48 If doctrine recognized that the prepayment was
payment for the walk-option, there would be no need for this indirect device for
enforcing the option price.
So, UCC 2-708(2) is perverse. What can we do about it? One response is to
interpret it narrowly; another is to enforce deposits and other termination remedies. More
generally, we should view the analysis as a step in chipping away at the dominance of the
notion that contract damages should be thought of as compensation for a wrongful breach
rather than as a decision variable for the parties.
I do not expect contract law to abandon the benefit of the bargain approach. I do
hope, however, that focusing on the contract design questions will have some affect. The
lost volume seller problem is one example. The demise of the “new business” rule in
most jurisdictions provides another illustration of the overreach of the compensation
norm.49 Suppose that one party were to terminate an agreement (breach) early enough in
the process so that the other party had not yet earned anything. The rule had been that
lost profits for a new business were too speculative and therefore there could be no
recovery. The compensation norm has progressively undermined the bar. Instead of
asking what the promisee could have earned had the contract been performed, it would be
more useful to ask instead what sort of protection for its reliance should the promisee
have bargained for. There is no reason to believe that the answer would be the same. The
new business rule, although somewhat arbitrary, would probably be a better default rule.
If parties wanted to make decisions in reliance, they should say how much protection
they require. Perhaps the battle has been lost by now and it is too late to resurrect the rule.
We can, however, nudge doctrine a bit in the right direction by requiring a high standard
of proof for the lost profits on the one hand, and by facilitating the limitation of damages
on the other.
B. Quantity Adjustment
48

Neri (note 44) also was a counterclaim in response to the buyer’s suit for return of a
down payment. However, these cases appear to be an exception. Only around ten percent
of the reported cases involve a counterclaim.
49 A new business, or one that has no history of past profits, would be denied
recovery because the damages were too uncertain and speculative. Cite for the
disappearance of the new business rule.
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When determining the quantity in a long-term contract for the sale of goods, the
parties confront a problem. Conditions on both the demand and supply side can vary over
time and they might want to adjust the quantity as new information becomes available.
When the manufacturer, say, of automobiles enters into supply contracts, it wants the
flexibility to react as new information regarding the demand for specific models comes in.
If the news is bad, the manufacturer generally maintains the right to cancel part or all of
the order. For example, the standard General Motors Purchase Order said:
Buyer may change the rate of scheduled shipments or direct temporary
suspension of scheduled shipments, neither of which shall entitle
Seller to a modification of the price for goods or services covered by this
order.
* * *
In addition to any other rights of Buyer to cancel or terminate this order,
Buyer may at its option immediately terminate all or any part of this order,
at any time and for any reason, by giving written notice to Seller.50
If GM did exercise its option to cut back its order, the contract gave the seller the
equivalent of the standard reliance remedy. GM would pay for all items that had already
been completed under the purchase order and the costs of work-in-progress less the value
of any goods the supplier could resell to third parties.
Long-term variable quantity contracts are quite common. They are even singled
out in the UCC which recognizes both “full output” and “requirements” contracts.51 A
full output contract gives the seller discretion —if I choose to produce any of this product,
you promise to take all of it. A requirements contract gives the discretion to the buyer—I
will only take my requirements from you and you promise to be ready to sell to me any
amount that I desire. The counterparty would be reluctant to make such an open-ended
commitment, and the agreement would likely include some limitation on that discretion.
For example, the buyer might agree to take all its requirements for the operation of a
particular plant; or it might agree to limit the seller’s obligation to a monthly maximum.
The contract will give discretion to adapt to changed circumstances to the party that
values it most, and the price of that flexibility will reflect the reliance of the counterparty.
The contract could constrain the discretion in a variety of ways. Unfortunately, the UCC
ignores any functional limitation and instead uses the amorphous standard of “good faith”
to limit the discretion.
Consider a firm that, along with its primary product, produces a byproduct that
has some modest commercial value, but if it is not removed promptly will cause
50

cite. Other automobile contracts have a similar structure, although they tend to be a bit
more generous in allowing the supplier to recover some costs beyond the but-for costs.
See Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958-9 (2005-2006).
51
U.C.C. § 306(1).
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problems for the producer who might have to add storage space or, in the extreme, curtail
production of its primary product. Examples include petroleum coke (petcoke), a
byproduct of the coking process for refining petroleum to produce gasoline and other
valuable products, and day-old bread, an inevitable byproduct of the production and sale
of fresh bread. The firm could enter into a long-term contract to assure prompt removal of
the byproduct. If the byproduct had no economic value, this would simply be the
equivalent of a trash removal contract; if, as in these examples, there is some economic
value, the contracting problem is more interesting.52
Petcoke’s commercial value is low, less than 3% of the value of the oil. To
produce petcoke, a refinery had to add a coker, a multi-million dollar plant with no other
use. The buyer would operate a calciner, also a single use, multi-million dollar item. The
primary use for the calcined coke was to make anodes, which were used to produce
aluminum. There were, to simplify things a bit, two different types of contracts. In one,
the refinery (seller) had very limited storage space and the buyer had the capacity to take
petcoke from a number of refineries and hold it in inventory. The seller desired the
freedom to make all its decisions on the basis of the demand for gasoline and other
refined products, not petcoke. Granting this flexibility was essentially costless to the
buyer—there was no reliance on this particular supplier. The resultant contract was a fulloutput contract which gave the seller complete discretion as to how much coke it would
produce; the buyer promised to immediately remove the petcoke and bore all the risks of
quantity fluctuation.
The second type of contract concerned the simultaneous construction of a coker
and an adjacent calciner operated by an aluminum producer. Because petcoke was
expensive to transport, the buyer’s only practical source would be the output of the new
coker. To protect the buyer’s reliance, the contract gave the quantity decision to the buyer.
The contract specified a maximum amount, but allowed the buyer to take less if it so
chose. The buyer’s discretion was constrained to take into account the refinery’s reliance.
For example, one contract included a “stand-by” fee, which amounted to about 40% of
the monthly quantity; even if the buyer took no petcoke it would have to pay. Other
contracts with the aluminum producers had similar constraints on the seller’s freedom to
vary quantity.
The stand-by fee is one variation on a “take-or-pay” contract. In a take-or-pay
contract, the buyer agrees to pay for a certain percentage of the specified quantity,
regardless of whether or not it actually takes it. The price for the first, say, 20% of the
product in any given month is, in effect, zero. If the value of the seller’s plant is
contingent on the continued purchases by the buyer, the guaranteed “take” is one way to
protect the seller’s reliance. The greater the reliance, other things equal, the higher the
guaranteed payment. The seller’s reliance need not, in general, be fully protected—that is,
the parties can share the risk of a bad outcome setting the sum of the guaranteed
payments below the seller’s costs if the buyer were to order less than the minimum;
however, there can be scenarios in which the guaranteed payments would exceed the cost.
52

These illustrations, and others, are examined in more detail in FRAMING, ch. 5.
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That possibility has made take-or-pay clauses (or a variation such as a minimum
quantity) subject to the penalty clause doctrine. A significant case in which a court (Judge
Posner, to be precise) found a minimum quantity clause to be a penalty is Lake River v
Carborundum.53 I will turn to that shortly, but first I want to discuss the leading New
York case regarding a variable quantity clause, Feld v Levy.54
Levy baked and sold rye bread and inevitably produced, as a byproduct, stale and
imperfect loaves. It decided to install an oven to convert these into breadcrumbs which
had some commercial value. To assure prompt removal, it entered into a one year, full
output contract with Feld. Either party could cancel the contract on six months notice. To
protect its reliance, Levy required that Feld obtain a “faithful performance” bond.
Because Feld had other sources of breadcrumbs, the contract put no constraints on Levy’s
discretion. Levy was disappointed with the results and, after failing to renegotiate the
contract price, dismantled the oven and ceased producing breadcrumbs. Dismantling the
oven did not amount to termination of the agreement since Levy was required to give six
months notice; had it reinstalled the oven, it would still have been obliged to deliver the
crumbs to Feld. Feld sued for breach, arguing that Levy could not in good faith reduce its
output to zero.
The Court of Appeals held that, despite the contract language, the seller was not
free to decide whether it should produce any breadcrumbs at all. The implied duty of
good faith required that it continue to produce breadcrumbs “even if there be no profit. In
circumstances such as these and without more, defendant would be justified, in good
faith, in ceasing production of the single item prior to cancellation only if its losses from
continuance would be more than trivial, which, overall, is a question of fact.”55 The court
failed to recognize that Levy was the one making an investment—the toaster oven—in
reliance upon the contract. The cost to Feld of granting the discretion was zero. The
court, in effect, held that Levy promised that it would be willing to lose some money—
but not too much—in order to protect Feld's non-existent reliance. The contract priced
Levy’s discretion at zero—the court trumped it for no good reason.
In Lake River, Judge Posner ruled that a minimum quantity clause was an
unenforceable penalty.56 Lake River agreed to bag an abrasive powder produced by
Carborundum. They entered into a three-year agreement with a minimum of 22,500 tons
over the life of the contract. Lake River installed bagging equipment costing $89,000 to
be used exclusively for Carborundum. The decision did not note one feature of the
contract—Lake River promised that it would bag up to 400 tons per week; Carborundum
could conceivably have asked Lake River to bag over 60,000 tons during the life of the
contract. The contract was not exclusive on either side—both were free to deal with
53

769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
335 N.E.2d 320 (1975). For more detail on this case, see GOLDBERG, supra note 14, at
pp. 117-119.
55
Feld, 335 N.E.2d at 323.
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others during the contract period. Times were tough for Carborundum and it only
managed to deliver about 12,000 tons. Lake River sued, claiming that it should be paid
for the 10,500 tons that Carborundum had failed to deliver. The case was framed in terms
of whether the suspect clause was for liquidated damages or a penalty. Carborundum’s
defense was that it was an unenforceable penalty clause, and Judge Posner agreed. He
noted that any shortfall would have left Lake River with a greater profit than if the
minimum had been reached. If the breach had occurred on the first day, he noted, the
damages would have been over five times the investment that Lake River was making in
special bagging equipment.
Instead of framing the matter in terms of liquidated damages versus penalty, it is
more productive to ask why the agreement was structured in that way. Carborundum was
given substantial discretion as to whether it should use Lake River’s facility and, if so,
how much. The contract effectively set a fixed fee and a price for the first 22,500 tons of
$0. Lake River promised that during the three-year period it would make available
capacity to bag 400 tons per week at the contract price. The court treated Lake River’s
investment in the new bagging equipment as determining the outer boundary of its
reliance. However, it also had to have workers on hand to handle any product delivered
(up to the weekly maximum); in addition, it faced the opportunity cost of holding the
capacity ready for the entire period. The minimum quantity indirectly set a price for the
flexibility. Did the deal overprice Carborundum’s discretion? Ex post, yes. But ex ante, it
is not so clear. Perhaps Carborundum did pay too much for the flexibility, but there is no
reason to second-guess the consideration paid for this valuable service. At the end of the
three years, Lake River had fully performed—it had remained ready, willing, and able to
take 400 tons per week for the entire period. All that remained to be performed was the
payment by Carborundum.
The fundamental point in all these examples is that discretion can be allocated to
the party that values it most and the counterparty can protect its reliance by, in effect,
charging a price for the flexibility. By failing to recognize how parties resolve the
reliance-flexibility tradeoff, contract doctrine can get in the way, using concepts like
good faith (Feld) and penalty clause (Lake River) to thwart the parties’ intentions. The
greater the reliance, other things equal, the higher the price. That the price is not quoted
explicitly matters not. These examples have all concerned reductions in quantity, but
similar problems can arise when the seller wants to increase quantity. The contract can
have a maximum (Like Lake River’s 400 ton weekly maximum); if the seller wants to
provide more, the contract could bar it, which would give the buyer a base line from
which to negotiate a price for the increased quantity. There are a lot of alternatives. For
example, in a contract between Columbia Nitrogen and Royster (a casebook staple), the
buyer could ask for more if the seller had the capacity to provide it. But it could only ask.
The contract did not prevent the seller from using the capacity to sell to others, so the
ability to sell to others, in effect, meant that the additional quantity could be sold at the
current market price, rather than at the contract price.57

57
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II. Reliance and Consequential Damages
The role of reliance in a consequential damage claim is different. In a typical case
one party, A, relies on the successful performance by the other, B, but is disappointed.
Perhaps B was negligent, as in Hadley v Baxendale.58 Or perhaps B was not at fault, but
for reasons beyond its control B failed to perform.59 In either instance, A might have a
claim for compensation for losses it suffered as a consequence of its reliance. Contract
doctrine classifies these consequential damages as expectation damages, but they are a
consequence of A’s reliance upon B’s satisfactory performance. The failure to perform
here, unlike the foregoing discussion, is not normally the result of the promisor
exercising an option (although, as I will note below sometimes the failure is deliberate).
When delivery of Hadley’s shaft was delayed, Hadley was forced to shut
down his mill. Hadley’s claim for lost profits arising from the closure was denied. His
failure to have another shaft available was the unusual circumstance cited by Baron
Alderson (and, subsequently, countless others) for rejecting Hadley’s claim for the
lost profits. Baxendale controlled the likelihood of the bad event—delay—occurring.
But the consequences of that bad event were, in large part, controlled by Hadley.
That raises the question: to what extent could Hadley run his business in reliance
upon Baxendale’s performance?
Baron Alderson recognized only one thing Hadley could have done to avoid the
consequences—hold an extra shaft (an input) in inventory. But there were many
other things he could have done prior to handing the shaft over to Baxendale. He
could have carried a larger inventory of flour (the output); or he could have
recouped the lost output by running the mill at a higher level of output after the
shaft had arrived. (In effect, that entails carrying a larger inventory of productive
capacity—another input.) There is no reason why Hadley had to hold his inventory
of inputs or output at this one location—he could have diversified. Any of these
actions would have avoided Hadley’s loss of profits (or, at least, substantially
reduced them).
The contract design problem then comes down to this: should Baxendale
compensate Hadley for the losses he incurred in reliance upon satisfactory
performance or should Hadley bear the consequences so that he might be
incentivized to control the costs? Some, like Professor Melvin Eisenberg, argue in
favor of the former.60 The evidence seems to favor the latter. Despite the fact that
58
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“In most cases involving consequential damages it can be assumed that the buyer has
acted prudently during the period before the contract was made, because reasons of self21

the UCC and Restatement (Second) both allow for the recovery of consequential
damages that were reasonably foreseeable,61 disclaimers of consequential damages
are ubiquitous. Scott & Schwartz found that clauses limiting damages to repair and
replacement were common. 62
The reason is not terribly surprising. If a carrier like Baxendale were to be liable
for the shipper’s lost profits, and if it could neither price the risk nor disclaim the
liability, then it would in effect be providing mandatory insurance to all its
customers without the tools insurers customarily use (copayments, deductibles,
monitoring, screening, etc.) to cope with the inevitable adverse selection and moral
hazard. That insurance (and the extra costs of dealing with customers who make
their inventory decisions in reliance on compensation from the carrier if things go
awry) would be a cost of doing business which it would have to cover by charging
higher rates to customers. If the costs to the shippers of self‐insuring and self‐
protecting were less than the implicit insurance of the carriers, then the disclaimer
would result in savings for shippers as a group.
Buyer forms often do allow for the recovery of consequential damages. In a
battle of the forms, given the knockout rule adopted by most jurisdictions,
consequential damages would be recoverable, although still subject to that
jurisdiction’s interpretation of Hadley.63 In negotiated contracts my impression is
that the disclaimers are common, consistent with the notion that the buyer is in the
regard will have led him to do so. Under Posner's argument, prudence would require
every factory owner to carry the spare parts for a virtually complete factory, housed
alongside his operating factory. In fact, however, calculations concerning the optimum
supply of spare parts are enormously complex and must reflect the probability that parts
will fail, the cost of waiting for needed spare parts that are not kept in inventory, the cost
of capital employed in investing in spare parts, the cost of maintaining spare parts, and
the actual or imputed rental costs for storing spare parts. There is little or no reason to
believe either that the mill owner in Hadley v. Baxendale failed to maintain an optimum
supply of spare parts in the period before the crankshaft broke or that under a less
demanding foreseeability standard individuals or firms would generally fail to optimize
just because they might later enter into a contract.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 563, 582 (1992).
61
The UCC does not use the term “reasonably foreseeable,” but, as Professor Eisenberg
notes, “the ‘reason to know’ standard of § 2-715(2) of the UCC lends itself naturally to
the reasonably foreseeable interpretation.” See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 38, §12.14.
62
Robert E. Scott and Alan Schwartz, Market Damages, COLUMBIA L. REV. 2008. In
her study of Internet contracts Professor Wurgler found that almost every one
disclaimed consequential damages See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Realities of
Online Contracting, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 11, 15 (2011).
63

Not all courts adopting the knockout rule would allow recovery of consequential
damages; see Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d
1442 (7th Cir. 1992).
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best position to protect its reliance. However, I want to note two situations in which
the seller might not be able to limit its liability.
In the previous section, I suggested that when the contract is defining the tradeoff
between discretion and reliance, the hostility to the notion that one party to the contract
has an option to perform or pay the consequences is misplaced. However, the hostility to
the option concept has more bite in cases involving claims for consequential damages.
There is a difference between negligently shipping a shaft versus a willful failure to do so.
Although contract law is often characterized as a no‐fault regime, courts have
found devices for taking fault into account. As McCormick wrote over 70 years ago:
Would not our courts enhance the realism of the rules and make them
easier for juries to accept if they gave formal approval to the tendency,
written large upon the actual results of the cases, to discriminate
between the liability for consequential damages of the wilful and
deliberate contract‐breaker on the one hand, and of the party who has
failed to carry out his bargain through inability or mischance? Our
rules should sanction, as our actual practice probably does, the award
of consequential damages against one who deliberately and wantonly
breaks faith, regardless of the foreseeability of the loss when the
contract was made. We shall then have completed the process, begun
piece‐meal in Hadley v. Baxendale, of borrowing from the French Civil
Code its theory of damages in contract.64
There is considerable dispute as to how to distinguish a willful breach from any
other. Cancellation of an order is deliberate, but few would find it willful. Corbin
was disparaging of the very notion of willfulness: “The word most commonly used is
‘wilful’; and it is seldom accompanied by any discussion of its meaning or
64

Charles T. McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for
Breach of Contract, 19 MINN. L. REV. 497, 517-518 (1934-1935); “Aversion and disgust
and hatred excited by a defendant's wilful breach of contract, and pity aroused by the
predicament in which another defendant is placed by his honest and unintentional breach
of contract, have swayed judges, as well as juries, in the actual administration of the law.”
Ralph S. Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 687 (1931-32).
Fuller and Perdue, supra note 1, pp. 85-86, note that fault is taken account of indirectly
by manipulating the foreseeability doctrine. For more recent arguments for recognizing
fault and willfulness, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law:
Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and
Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2009); George Cohen, The Fault Lines
in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994) (different measures of damages
depending in part on fault); Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Willfulness Versus
Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1517, 1518 (2009); Robert A. Hillman, The Importance Of Fault In Contract Law,
Working Paper.
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classification of the cases that should fall within it. Its use indicates a childlike faith
in the existence of a plain and obvious line between the good and the bad, between
unfortunate virtue and unforgivable sin.”65 Contrast this with his enthusiastic
approval of “good faith,” which surely suffers from the same flaw. Notwithstanding
the difficulties, courts do make that distinction and, more importantly, the parties
themselves often do so in their contracts. Even if they disclaim liability for
consequential damages, they can include a significant exception—the disclaimer will
not apply if the breach were due to gross negligence or willful behavior.66 They
might not have any idea about what they mean by willful; rather than spelling it out,
they are content to defer the definition to the ex post determination by courts. 67
In a corporate acquisition, for example, the buyer’s option price can depend on
intent. In Hexion,68 if the contract could not close despite the buyer’s “best efforts,” it
would have to pay a breakup fee of $325 million. If, however, the deal failed to close
because of a “knowing and intentional breach of any covenant,” damages would be
uncapped. Citing a number of bad acts by the buyer and its lawyers, the vice
chancellor found that the breach was intentional After losing at trial the buyer
settled for $1 billion.
In a Hadley‐type scenario, a deliberate deviation by a carrier to pick up a more
valuable shipment could result in liability for the shipper’s consequential damages.
Of course, that can be contracted over—the seller could maintain the flexibility to
deviate.69 The shipper might be content to give the carrier that option in exchange
5 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 545 (1951). For a more recent and
more measured, skeptical take on willfulness, see Richard Craswell, When is a
Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link Between Definitions and Damages, 107 Mich. L.
Rev. 1501 (2008‐2009).
66 One of the standard forms of the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations
(FOSFA, contract 201, clause 25) has an interesting variant on the effect of fault on
damages: “If the arbitrators consider the circumstances of the default justify it they may,
at their absolute discretion, award damages on a different quantity and/or award
additional damages.”
67 Scott and Triantis provide a powerful analysis of the tradeoff between the
defining the terms at the front end and deferring definition to a third party (courts,
arbitrators) at the back end; see Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Anticipating
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814 (2006).
65
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Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).
Ocean World Lines Bill of Lading TERMS & CONDITIONS provides an illustration
of that flexibility: “The Carrier does not undertake that the Goods will be transported
from or loaded at the place of receiving or loading or will arrive at the place of discharge,
destination or transshipment aboard any particular vessel or other conveyance or at any
particular date or time or to meet any particular market or in time for any particular use.
Scheduled or advertised departure and arrival times are only expected times and may be
advanced or delayed if the Carrier or any Connecting Carrier shall find it necessary,
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for a lower price. Suppliers in many contexts do offer interruptible service at a
reduced price.
The willfulness exception can be rationalized in terms of the buyer’s reliance.
For innocent mistakes by the seller, the onus is on the buyer to protect itself. Buyers
can make their decisions relying on the seller’s “normal” behavior, even if that
behavior results in a seller breach. Behavior by the seller that substantially
increased the likelihood of failure, however, would be outside the buyer’s
reasonable expectations—buyers needn’t self‐protect against that. However,
recognizing a fault‐based exception can expose the seller to juridical risk. Given the
difficulty in defining willful behavior and the risk that a fact finder would define a
garden variety failure as willful, parties might be reluctant to include a willfulness
exception.70
The second exception mirrors the second prong of the Hadley rule: damages “as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time when they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach.” It is not the mere contemplation that matters. The sellers have knowledge of
the buyer’s vulnerability, they know that the buyer is relying on their performance,
and they accept the risk that their failure would result in substantial damages.
Contracts between suppliers and automobile manufacturers make clear the buyer’s
intended use71 and would assess sellers for at least some of the costs if there were a

prudent or convenient. In no event shall the Carrier be liable for consequential or other
damages for delay in the scheduled departures or arrivals of the vessel or other
conveyance transporting the Goods or for any other matter.”
(http://www.oceanworldlines.com/BL-terms-conditions.aspx)
70As an example of the juridical risk, consider this disclaimer by a grain elevator
operator:
The elevator management, in its sole discretion, may alter the turn of vessels
to be loaded [a] when, in its judgment, it is in the best interest of the elevator
operations; [b] when there is urgent need to receive or load to a ship a
particular grade and kind of grain; [c] to facilitate the berth conditions; or [d]
whenever the elevator decides that there is nonavailability in the elevator of
adequate grade, quantity, or quality of grain to be shipped or loaded on the
vessel without delaying the vessel itself, or delay, prevent, or obstruct the
normal elevator activity
* * *
The elevator shall not be liable for demurrage, damages for delay or loss of
dispatch time incurred by any vessel or charterer for any cause other than
wilful or gross negligent acts of the elevator management. (Pagnan & F.Lli v.
Mississippi River Grain Elevator, Inc. 700 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1983)).
A jury, and the Court of Appeals, found a fairly minor delay to be wilful.
71
“Seller acknowledges that Seller knows of Buyer's intended use and expressly warrants
that all goods covered by this order which have been selected, designated, manufactured,
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breach of warranty (to the consumer) or a product recall. Ford’s standard form, for
example, said: "At its option, the Buyer may debit the Supplier for up to 50% of the
Actual Recall Costs . . . if the Buyer has made a good faith determination that the
Supplier is likely to be liable for some portion of the total costs.”72
The multi‐year supply contract between John Deere and Stanadyne made
liability for consequential damages contingent on both knowledge and fault. The
wording reversed the usual pattern of saying no liability unless the seller passed
some culpability hurdle. Instead the seller would be liable unless it was without
fault:
STANADYNE CORPORATION acknowledges that DEERE requires on‐
time delivery in order to operate its plants. The parties further
acknowledge that the precise amount of damages which DEERE would
sustain in the event STANADYNE CORPORATION were to fail to make
timely or conforming deliveries of Parts would be difficult to
determine. Therefore, the parties agree that STANADYNE
CORPORATION shall be responsible for any and all damages resulting
from STANADYNE CORPORATION's failure to make timely or
conforming deliveries of Parts, including, but not limited to, mutually
agreed upon costs DEERE incurs for the correction of Parts with
quality problems and mutually agreed upon costs DEERE incurs in
connection with DEERE's machining and/or assembly line
downtime. . . . STANADYNE CORPORATION shall not be responsible
for the above damages if such out‐of‐order (late) delivery or non‐
delivery results from a cause beyond STANADYNE CORPORATION's
reasonable control without fault or negligence, provided that
STANADYNE CORPORATION has informed DEERE as soon as practical
of the problem.73
or assembled by Seller based upon Buyer's stated use, will be fit and sufficient for the
particular purposes intended by Buyer.” (GM Standard Form)
72
Ben-Shahar and White, supra note 40, 960. The GM form went further:
[S]hould any goods fail to conform to the warranties set forth in Paragraph
9, Buyer shall notify Seller and Seller shall, if requested by Buyer,
reimburse Buyer for any incidental and consequential damages caused by
such nonconforming goods, including, but not limited to, costs, expenses
and losses incurred by Buyer (a) in inspecting, sorting, repairing or
replacing such nonconforming goods; (b) resulting from production
interruptions, (c) conducting recall campaigns or other corrective service
actions, and (d) claims for personal injury (including death) or property
damage caused by such nonconforming goods. If requested by Buyer,
Seller will enter into a separate agreement for the administration or
processing of warranty chargebacks for nonconforming goods.
73
Long Term Agreement Between Deere & Company and Stanadyne Corp., effective
November 1, 2007.
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I must reiterate that these remain exceptions to the basic point. When parties
design their contracts rarely will they protect the promisee’s reliance on the promisor’s
successful performance. The promisee’s ability to control the adverse consequences
usually would result in consequential damages being disclaimed.
III. Reliance and Restitution When Performance Is Excused
Performance of a contract could be excused under various doctrines—
impossibility, impracticability, and frustration—or under the terms of the contract—force
majeure or material adverse change. Prior to the occurrence of the event that excused
performance the parties might have incurred costs in reliance on the contract. A buyer
who had made a partial payment may want restitution; a seller who had advertised an
event or partially completed performance might want compensation for its reliance costs.
The legal analysis of both sets of claims has been muddled by notions of fairness and
justice (or, as the commentators prefer, avoiding injustice).74 Thus, if performance is
excused, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says that “either party may have a claim
for relief including restitution . . . . [I]f the rules . . . will not avoid injustice, the court
may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the parties'
reliance interests.”75 Fuller and Perdue argued that the equitable resolution entailed
recognition of the restitution and reliance interests: “the most satisfactory solution of the
difficulty may well be to relieve the promisor from his duty, at the price, not simply of
returning benefits, but of making good the other party's losses through reliance on the
contract.”76

74

Much of the following discussion is based on Victor P. Goldberg, After Frustration:
Three Cheers for Chandler v. Webster, 68 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1133 (2011).
75
Restatement (Second), § 272. In England, the Frustrated Contracts Act provides for
restitution of money paid before the discharging event subject to a key proviso. The
repayment could be offset, in whole or in part, if that party had incurred reliance
expenditures if the court “considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances
of the case.” Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40
(hereafter the “Frustrated Contracts Act.”).
76
The full context of their argument is as follows:
In such a field, where no technical rules serve to obstruct an insight into the
purposes underlying contract law, it would seem inevitable that the cases would
reveal a distinction between the three interests which have been described in this
article. Such a distinction has definitely been taken in America (though
apparently not in England ) between the expectation and restitution interests.
Where a contract has become impossible of performance, or its object is
frustrated, it has been recognized that the most equitable adjustment of the
situation may call for relieving the party from liability for future performance
(expectation interest denied), and at the same time imposing on him a duty to
return benefits received under the contract (restitution interest protected).
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In the first Anglo-American case recognizing the impossibility defense, Taylor v
Caldwell,77 a venue was destroyed before the contracted-for event (a concert series) was
to take place. The promoter sued for his reliance costs (£ 58),78 the costs incurred in
preparation for the intended concert series. The claim was denied on the grounds that
there had been no breach; there was no focus on whether there could be compensation for
reliance when performance had been excused, although a negative answer was implicit in
the decision. In the Coronation Cases, arising from the postponement of the coronation
procession following King Edward’s appendicitis attack, the House of Lords considered
the question and left the losses where they fell. The renter, under Chandler v Webster,79
was responsible for any payments that had been made or were due before the procession
was postponed. There would be no restitution.
This did not sit well with many. Contrasting the English rule with that of Scotland
the House of Lords noted “in high legal quarters a feeling both of uneasiness and of
disrelish as to the English rule,” which “works well enough among tricksters, gamblers
and thieves.”80 After decades of critical comment, the House of Lords reversed itself in
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd..81 A British
manufacturer agreed to manufacture a flax‐hackling machine for a Polish buyer for
delivery in three to four months. The buyer paid about a third of the contract price
when the order was placed and the manufacturer started production. Unfortunately,
the Germans decided to invade Poland before the machine was finished. The House
of Lords ruled that the contract had been frustrated and then overruled Chandler v
Webster. The seller would have to return the prepayment. It did not, however,
require any compensation to the seller for costs it might have incurred in reliance
on the contract. It might be unfortunate, said Lord Chancellor Simon, if the seller had
relied, but, absent specific language, the reliance would not be protected.
But in this field, where borderline cases are a normal phenomenon, it would
seem that the reliance interest should also play an important role. Where the
court is in doubt whether, the excuse should be permitted at all, the most
satisfactory solution of the difficulty may well be to relieve the promisor from
his duty, at the price, not simply of returning benefits, but of making good the
other party's losses through reliance on the contract. In Germany, the Civil
Code expressly recognizes the usefulness of the reliance interest as a means of
accomplishing the most equitable allocation of the risks involved in
impossibility L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 379-380 (1937).
77
122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
78
Per capita annual income in England at the time was only around £30.
79
[1904] 1 K.B. 493.
80
Cantiare San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding, [1924] A.C. 226, 258-9 (H.L. 1923)
(Appeal taken from Scot).
81
[1943]. A.C. 32. Scottish law had rejected Chandler earlier. It attempted to restore the
pre-contract situation, requiring the refund of money prepaid and also compensating the
seller for at least some of its reliance costs. Cantiare San Rocco S’A., [1924] A.C. 226.
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While this result obviates the harshness with which the previous view
in some instances treated the party who had made a prepayment, it
cannot be regarded as dealing fairly between the parties in all cases,
and must sometimes have the result of leaving the recipient who has
to return the money at a grave disadvantage. He may have incurred
expenses in connexion with the partial carrying out of the contract
which are equivalent, or more than equivalent, to the money which he
prudently stipulated should be prepaid, but which he now has to
return for reasons which are no fault of his. He may have to repay the
money, though he has executed almost the whole of the contractual
work, which will be left on his hands. (1943, p. 49)
New legislation, he said, would be required. Parliament responded shortly
thereafter by passing the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 194382 which allowed
for compensation for reasonable reliance. About the best thing that can be said about the
Act is that it is virtually never used. Instead of leaving the parties where they were when
the contract was excused, the Chandler rule, the buyer would get restitution of any
prepayment and the seller, who incurred reliance costs, might be able to offset some or all
of that if a court thought it would be just to do so. What does that standard look like? In
one of the rare cases applying the Act, Lawton, J. said that the law grants the trial court
considerable discretion: “What is just is what the trial judge thinks is just. That being so,
an appellate court is not entitled to interfere with his decision unless it is so plainly wrong
that it cannot be just “83
As noted, the American rule is similar. In neither case is there any thought
about why the contracts might have structured the performance and payment obligations
as they had. The phasing of payment and performance is not merely a matter of whim; it
is a decision variable of the parties. The contract could determine whether either party
should be compensated after performance was excused; or it could simply leave the
parties where they were at the time the excusing event occurred. There are many reasons
why a buyer might make some payments before a project is completed and why it might
choose to make some or all of those payments non-refundable. The payment might be for
an option; or to provide working capital to the seller; or because the product is being
customized; or to assure the seller that after it had completed most of the performance,
the buyer would not have the incentive to renegotiate, taking advantage of the fact that
the costs have been sunk.84

The Restatement’s illustration of the problem is instructive. A (a contractor) is
working on an existing structure owned by B, but before completion of the job, the
structure is destroyed by fire and the contractor is excused.
82

Frustrated Contracts Act.
B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya), [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 232, 238.
84
For a longer list, see generally, Goldberg, supra note 63, p. 1146.
83
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A contracts with B to shingle the roof of B's house for $5,000, payable as
the work progresses. After A has spent $2,000 doing part of the work and
has been paid $1,800, much of the house including the roof is destroyed
by fire without his fault, and the duties of performance of both A and B
are discharged . . . . The work done before the fire increased the market
price and the insurable value of the house by $1,500. A is entitled to
restitution of $1,500 from B and B is entitled to restitution of $1,800 from
A.
* * *
[T]he fire also destroyed shingles that had cost A $500 and that were
piled near the house for the rest of the work. A is not entitled to restitution
of this loss from B. The court may, however, take this loss into
consideration in deciding whether to allow A restitution of $1,500 or
$2,000. 85
No reasons are given for the numbers. Why has B paid more than the benefit it had thus
far “received” and less than A’s costs? Why treat the shingles piled near the house
differently? If one cares about reliance, then there is no reason to single these out. Why
care at all about the benefit B received, since after the fire there were no benefits? Why
go through the effort of ascertaining the value added pre-fire and the contractor’s costs
(most of which would likely be labor costs)? Accidents during construction projects are
hardly unexpected. One would expect that parties would anticipate these problems in
their contract design. And, in fact, they do. What they do is ignore both reliance and
restitution.86 The contract is terminated and neither party has to compensate the other.
The close link between progress payments and performance will mean that leaving the
losses where they fell will generally work well. The best thing that can be said for the
doctrinal solution is that it is irrelevant.87
I do not mean to suggest that in all instances in which performance would be
excused parties would never deviate from the “leave the losses where they fall”
resolution. They do. But they do so as a matter of planning, not as a matter of justice.
While the language of excuse cases (and the scholarly literature) often suggests that
the parties did not, or could not, have planned for the specific event, that misses the
point. The King’s appendicitis might have been beyond their contemplation, but the
possibility that the procession might have been postponed for any reason was not.
In fact, there was a very active insurance market and a number of contracts did
explicitly recognize the possibility of postponement.88 More generally, as Triantis
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§ 377 illustrations 4 and 5.
See Goldberg, supra note 63, 1166-67.
87 Because the contracts typically resolve the problem, most of the case law
providing the basis for the Restatement (Second) dates back to the First World War.
88
See Victor P. Goldberg, Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS, 1 (2010).
86
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has argued, specific risks can be allocated as part of a more broadly defined risk.89
Planners could, if they so desired, differentiate between categories of risk when
determining whether there should be some compensation for restitution or reliance.
So, for example, a Rod Stewart contract distinguished between two categories of
excuse. If the performance could not be rendered because of the usual acts of God
(floods, fires, riots, strikes, etc.) the performance would be rescheduled; if he were
ill or incapacitated, the show would be cancelled and he would have to refund any
prepayments.90
IV. Reliance and Revocation
The interplay of reliance and injustice shows up in other sections of the
Restatement, notably in Section 90 (making a promise absent consideration
enforceable)91 and Section 87(2) (making an offer irrevocable).92 Grant Gilmore’s
prediction that promissory estoppel would swallow up the consideration doctrine has not
come to pass. Quite the opposite. It remains a bit player in determining the enforceability
of promises. Roger Traynor’s innovation—the irrevocable offer—has fared even worse.
Aside from the context of subcontractor bids in public construction projects it has had
virtually no impact. . My concern here is not with the impact of the decision. I have done
that elsewhere.93 Rather, I want to focus on the cases within the Drennan ambit to
illustrate how slippery the reliance concept is when courts try to implement it. It’s not a
pretty sight.
Reliance can mean different things to different people (and courts); in practice it
meant so many different things, that it is not clear that it meant anything at all.94 In
classical contract law an offeror is free to revoke an offer before acceptance and a
counteroffer is a rejection of an offer. Traynor’s innovation was to use reliance to make
the offer irrevocable. In Drennan, after the general contractor had been named the
successful low bidder, the subcontractor informed him that it had erred in preparing its
bid (an offer) and it was therefore withdrawing it. The GC completed the project with a
89

George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the
Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 465 (1992).
90
Described in Goldberg, supra 76, p. 10.
91
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.”
92
“An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary
to avoid injustice.”
93
See Victor P. Goldberg, Traynor (Drennan) versus Hand (Baird): Much Ado About
(Almost) Nothing, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS, 539 (2011).
94
Of course, in another context Judge Traynor celebrated the indeterminacy of language;
see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968).
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new sub at a higher price and then sued the original sub for the difference. “[T]he
question,” said Traynor, “is squarely presented: Did plaintiff's reliance make defendant's
offer irrevocable?”95 “Given . . . [that the GC] is bound by his own bid, it is only fair that
[the GC] should have at least an opportunity to accept [the sub’s] bid after the general
contract has been awarded to him.”96 However, he added a qualification: “It bears noting
that a general contractor is not free to delay acceptance after he has been awarded the
general contract in the hope of getting a better price. Nor can he reopen bargaining with
the subcontractor and at the same time claim a continuing right to accept the original
offer.”97 Doing so, he suggested, would destroy reliance.
The GC’s reliance, therefore, is a question of fact. How could the court ascertain
whether the GC had in fact relied upon the sub’s bid? Traynor’s opinion set out the
criteria. The GC could not be found to have reasonably relied if: (1) the GC should have
known the bid was in error; (2) the GC proposed new terms (the counteroffer); or (3)
GC’s in general, or this specific GC, were known to shop the bid, and/or the GC shopped
the bid in this instance. Any of these might be enough to defeat reliance, but
implementation, especially of the last two, left much to be desired.
Consider first the counteroffer. Subs usually submit their bid to a number of
General Contractors. In most jurisdictions the GC must include the name of the sub it
used in preparing its proposal.98 After being named the winning bidder, the GC would
send a written contract to that sub. If the terms of that contract were deemed a material
alteration of the sub’s offer, then it could be treated as a counteroffer. Since in most
instances the sub’s offer consisted of a single number (no stated terms), it should not be
surprising that the terms of the GC’s form contract would differ. If the court found the
GC’s form terms materially different, it would have to conclude that the GC would no
longer be relying upon the sub’s offer, so the sub would be free to reject the counteroffer.
That is, the offer would be revocable.
In some instances subs raised this argument in defense and on occasion they
succeeded. The courts listed the non-conforming clauses and labeled them as either
material or non-material, although in most instances it is hard to tell how the court came
to the conclusion that it did. For example, in one of the cases holding for the sub, the
court recognized two clauses (among the seven) that made the GC’s written contract a
counteroffer: “The sub-contract prohibited the sub-contractor from continuing to employ
any person deemed by the owner, architect or contractor to be a nuisance or a detriment
to the job. . . [and] the sub-contract authorized the architect to discharge any workman
committing a nuisance upon certain parts of the premises.”99 It is hard to imagine that
these would be deal-breakers. Of course, the materiality of the contested terms in the
cases raising the defense had nothing to do with the sub’s rejection—it was simply a
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Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).
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Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).
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Most states require the listing of a sub if its bid exceeded a threshold.
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Hedden v. Lupinsky, 405 Pa. 609, 610-611 (1962).
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device for getting out of a bad deal. Nonetheless, the argument succeeded in negating
reliance in almost half the cases in which the courts considered it.
Traynor’s position on the role of bid shopping in negating reliance seems clear: A
GC could not “reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a
continuing right to accept the original offer.”100 If bid shopping were common in this
particular market could a GC rely on a sub’s offer? In a Minnesota case, the court noted
that the sub contended “that ‘bid shopping’ and ‘bid chopping’ are so common to the
Twin Cities area construction industry that prime contractors and subcontractors do not
expect to be bound by prices submitted by the subcontractors to the prime contractors and
that defendant was therefore not bound on its bid on the ventilation work because further
and final negotiations would take place at a later time.”101 However, since there was no
evidence that the GC had shopped this particular bid, the court found for the GC, holding
that its reliance was reasonable. This is a really peculiar argument. In effect the court is
saying that no one in this market relies on the prices quoted by subs, but in this one case
the GC did and that the reliance was reasonable.
Another case added an odd twist to the reliance argument. The GC, claimed the
court, did not rely on the offered price per se; rather it relied on the sub’s offer setting a
ceiling, and it would be free to bargain for a better price from this sub or its competitors
without having the offer lapse.102 That is, the GC could shop the bid at will, so long as it
ended up with a price at or below the sub’s bid. If it failed to do better, it could still hold
the sub to its bid. Hardly what Traynor had in mind. This case is an outlier, although one
economic analysis of Drennan does treat the sub’s irrevocable offer as a cap.103 The
decision does, however, indicate the broad discretion the courts have in applying the illdefined reliance standard to the question.
If the sub’s bid were treated as an irrevocable offer, the GC would have a
valuable option. The value increases with the length of time and the variance of the
sub’s costs, in particular, its opportunity costs. If the expected value of the option to
the GC were greater than the expected cost to the sub of providing it, the parties
would have an incentive to agree to make the option irrevocable for some period of
time. This does not mean that the GC would have to negotiate the revocability issue
with each potential sub; all that would be necessary would be that the GC set out the
criteria for revoking a bid in the bidding documents (and a presumption that courts
would enforce the terms of the bidding documents).104 The Drennan rule really gets
it backwards. Instead of having reliance determine the level of irrevocability, the
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law should allow the GC to determine the level of irrevocability it needs to protect
its reliance.
The reliance, according to Judge Traynor, was not symmetrical.105 Subs could
not claim that they relied on the GC. Why? Because the sub typically submits a bid to
a number of GC’s and it therefore relies on none of them. Subs have invariably lost,
although one court used the asymmetry to deny the GC’s reliance claim: “Allowing a
cause of action based on promissory estoppel in construction bidding also creates
the potential for injustice. It forces the subcontractor to be bound if the general
contractor uses his bid, even though the general contractor is not obligated to award
the job to that subcontractor. The general contractor is still free to shop around
between the time he receives the subcontractor's bid and the time he needs the
goods or services, to see if he can obtain them at a lower price.”106
When preparing its bid, whether the sub relied on this GC or on all the GC’s to
whom it submitted its bid, is really beside the point. The GC’s commitment to the sub
named in its bid, could be spelled out in the bidding documents. Apparently GC’s are
reluctant to make such a commitment. As a rule the sub does not get that protection by
contract. Indeed, subs have attempted to overcome the asymmetry by group action,
either through legislation or through private organizations like bid depositories.
Their efforts have only had limited success.107 The relevant point is that whether the
sub relied upon the GC or not says nothing about the extent to which a GC should be
bound to use a sub.
V. Reliance and Information
In complex contracts, like a corporate acquisition, the parties face two significant
problems. First, there is the adverse selection problem; the buyer needs information
regarding the quality of what it is buying. (If the deal were being financed in part by
stock, the seller would need information regarding the quality of the buyer as well.)
Second, there can be a temporal gap between execution of the contract and the closing
and a lot can happen in that period that would affect the value of the seller. Reliance is
implicated in both problems. Information is costly to produce and in many instances the
seller will be the best source of information regarding its quality. With little information,
the buyer fears that it is buying a lemon and would offer a price that reflected that fear.
The seller has an incentive to provide information that would reassure the buyer; it would
provide a package of representations and warranties that would fill in the details. The
contract would have to specify on which of the seller’s statements it would rely and how
that reliance would be protected. In the gap between execution and closing the buyer
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would rely upon the seller running the business in a manner that does not decrease the
value and the seller would rely upon the deal going through.108
The acquisition document will delineate the information on which the buyer
should and should not rely. Integration clauses and the parol evidence rule restrict, to
some extent, the ability of courts to look outside the written agreement. While there is
much hostility to the parol evidence rule amongst the professoriate, my understanding is
that, especially for sophisticated parties, the courts in most jurisdictions generally respect
these clauses. Professor Peter Linzer, one of the hostile ones, reluctantly concludes in his
update of the Corbin Treatise that courts generally respect the parol evidence rule.109
Professors Schwartz & Scott, decidedly less hostile, likewise found that the rule was alive
and well.110 I don’t want to be drawn into that debate. My concern here is with two
subtopics: no-reliance clauses and remedies for breach of a warranty. A central concern
in both is a recognition that litigation is expensive and imperfect. The leading New York
case, Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 111 does not quite fit the bill. It involves a contract
for purchase of a lease of a building—a simpler transaction in which it is at least
plausible that the buyer was not aware of the no‐reliance language. Nonetheless, it
is instructive.
The buyer in Danann contended that it was induced to enter into the sale by
false oral representations about operating expenses and profits that it would derive
from the investment. The contract included in the merger clause a disclaimer of any
representations regarding a litany of items, “except as specifically set forth in the
agreement.” The majority held that if this were a general and vague merger clause, it
would be “ineffective to exclude parol evidence to show fraud in inducing the
contract would then be dispositive of the issue.”112 But: “Here . . . plaintiff has in the
plainest language announced and stipulated that it is not relying on any
representations as to the very matter as to which it now claims it was defrauded.
Such a specific disclaimer destroys the allegations in plaintiff's complaint that the
agreement was executed in reliance upon these contrary oral representations.”
Since the buyer should have read and understood the contract, the court continued,
it “would be unrealistic to ascribe to plaintiff's officers such incompetence that they
did not understand what they read and signed.” Implicit in this argument is the
notion that the clause was tailored to this particular transaction. The dissent denied
this, noting that the clause was boilerplate. If a generic merger clause was
problematic, then why should a boilerplate clause do any better? The dissent’s
108
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primary argument did not rely on the fact that the clause was a standard clause.
Even if the clause had been bargained over, the buyer was entitled to its day in court
because “fraud vitiates every contract and every clause in it.”113
The case is complicated a bit by the fact that the disputed clause was not
bargained over. The buyer should have had legal advice and the advisor should
have had knowledge of the language. But one could at least argue that the majority’s
distinction between this clause and a generic merger clause failed. The duty to read
should apply equally to both or to neither. The more significant issue concerns no‐
reliance clauses that are specifically negotiated. The Danann rule has been applied
to the more complex transactions in the two primary commercial jurisdictions, New
York and Delaware.114
In a decision in which he recognized a no‐reliance clause, Judge Posner
distinguished contracts between sophisticated parties:115
In the trade, no‐reliance clauses are called “big boy” clauses (as in
“we're big boys and can look after ourselves”). But if someone who is
not a big boy—indeed is not even represented by counsel—signs a
big‐boy clause, there can be a problem, and this has led some courts to
require, before such a clause can be enforced, an inquiry into the
circumstances of its negotiation, to make sure that the signatory knew
what he was doing.
The no‐reliance clause complements the parol evidence rule by defining
which documents and alleged statements should not be considered by the court if a
dispute were to arise. The process of negotiating the clause itself could convey
valuable information, since the argument that the counterparty should not rely on X
could immediately raise a red flag. The no‐reliance clause can reduce juridical risk. If
allowing certain evidence in would substantially increase litigation costs without
increasing the accuracy of the verdict, the clause would benefit both parties, ex ante.
No‐reliance clauses, if enforceable, can play a meaningful role in controlling the
113
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costs of litigation. As then judge Alito noted “if anti-reliance clauses are not enforced,
the danger is that a contracting party may accept additional compensation for a risk that it
has no intention of actually bearing. This prevarication may amount to a fraud all its
own .... [T]he safer route is to leave parties that can protect themselves to their own
devices, enforcing the agreement they actually fashion.”116
Abry Partners provides an example of a contract that attempted to control
litigation costs with a no‐reliance clause. It involved the $500 million sale of a
portfolio company by one private equity firm to another. The deal—heavily
negotiated by sophisticated parties—included a number of representations and
warranties and an indemnification clause and escrow account limiting aggregate
liability for all misrepresentations or breaches to $20 million as the buyer’s sole and
exclusive remedy.117 In exchange for the indemnification clause, the seller gave up
all the materiality qualifiers of the representations and warranties. The contract
stated: “The provisions of [the indemnification clause] were specifically bargained
for and reflected in the amounts payable to the Selling Stockholder.” The buyer,
asking for rescission, claimed that some representations were inaccurate and, had it
known, it would not have closed the deal. The Delaware Chancery Court denied the
seller’s motion to dismiss. I do not want to get involved with the merits of that
decision. I simply want to underscore the notion that sophisticated parties can price
the buyer’s reliance on the accuracy of representations, ex ante.
In the absence of an indemnification clause, the buyer’s reliance on the
accuracy of the reps and warranties is protected in two ways. The accuracy at the
time made and at closing is usually a condition of closing. That is, if the
representations were inaccurate, the buyer would have an option to abandon. The
second form of protection is a money damage remedy for breach—a point to which I
will return.
If any misrepresentation, however trivial, would give the buyer the option to
abandon, the seller’s position is tenuous. The buyer could use a minor problem as a
pretext to take advantage of the changed situation at the time of closing. It could
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walk away from what has turned out to be a bad deal or it could use the threat of
termination to renegotiate the price. Sellers, of course, recognize this possibility
and they try to constrain the buyer’s option. Their primary tool is the materiality
qualifiers (the ones that were sacrificed in the Abry contract). Typically, the
agreements require that the reps and warranties be accurate in all material
respects; they are often further limited to inaccuracies which individually, or in the
aggregate, would constitute a material adverse effect (MAE). In addition, the closing
can be contingent on a broader condition: between the exercise and closing date
there has not been a material adverse change (MAC).118
The seller’s reliance has two components. First, there is the simple reliance
on the agreed price. It does not want to give the buyer the option to buy at the
contract price only if the market stays the same or goes up; after a price is agreed
upon, the buyer takes the risk of exogenous changes. Second, once the contract is
executed, the stand‐alone value of the seller’s business might be adversely affected.
Key personnel might start looking for new jobs; investment decisions are
postponed; relations with old customers, suppliers, and bankers might be impaired.
The greater the seller’s reliance on the deal going through, the more protection it
will try to get. The protection can take the form of exceptions to the MAE/MAC
making it more difficult for the buyer to walk.119 The buyer bears the risk of
exogenous change; the seller bears the risk of endogenous change (its behavior
reducing the value of the combined firm) and its inaccurate statements.
Alternatively, the parties could avoid the costs of ascertaining the merits of the
seller’s decision to walk by granting the buyer an unconditional option to abandon,
protecting the seller’s reliance with a breakup fee.120
The reps and warranties can survive closing for a contractually defined period of
time. If after closing the buyer learned that a warranty was inaccurate, it could sue for
damages. What if it learned before closing, but still went through with the deal? Could it
close the deal and then sue for the breach? The answer in the key American jurisdictions
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(New York and Delaware) is Yes. Parties are, however, free to contract over it.121 The
practice has a name—sandbagging—and it is embodied in the ABA Model Stock
Purchase Agreement: “The right to indemnification, reimbursement or other remedy
based upon any such representation [or] warranty… will not be affected by… any
Knowledge acquired (or capable of being acquired) at any time, whether before or
after the execution and delivery of this Agreement or the Closing Date, with respect
to the accuracy or inaccuracy of… such representation [or] warranty….”122 In the
absence of such a clause, some courts have held that the buyer would have to prove
reliance on the misrepresentation and, if the buyer knew the truth before closing it
could not have relied. The alternative formulation notes that the buyer relies when
it sets the initial price; if it had known that the representation was false, the contract
price would have been less. Both sides can plausibly invoke reliance in their favor.
The weight of authority, and practice, is with the pro‐sandbagging.123
If the value of the target had increased prior to closing, the buyer might want
to complete the deal even knowing that the representation was false. If it could not
pursue its claim, it would end up with less of a bargain than if the representation
were accurate or if the contract price had reflected the actual state of affairs. Two
other factors argue in favor of sandbagging. First, there is a moral hazard problem. If
the value of the target has gone up the seller could recapture some of the increased
value by breaching the reps and warranties. Absent sandbagging, the buyer would
have to weigh the gains from closing against the alternative of not closing and suing
for the breach. Second, there is a costly litigation problem; if a buyer were to sue for
breach of warranty in an anti‐sandbagging jurisdiction, the seller could allege that
someone at the buyer’s firm had been made aware of the misrepresentation before
closing, and the truth of that statement would be a fact question which likely would
be enough to survive summary judgment.
VI. Concluding Remarks
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Reliance, I am sure, shows up in many other nooks and crannies of contract
law. My purpose here has been twofold. First, I want to illustrate the wide range of
contract questions impacted by reliance. But, second, I want to emphasize that the
importance of the reliance concept does not translate directly into contract doctrine.
That one party relies on the continued performance of the counterparty does not
suggest how, if at all, that reliance should be protected. Doctrine in many areas does
not serve to facilitate contracting; rather it can be an obstacle that transactional
lawyers must overcome.
In their Introduction, Fuller and Perdue emphasized the importance of
recognizing purpose: “We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is
possible to manipulate legal concepts without the orientation which comes from the
simple inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed? Nietzsche’s observation
that the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do,
retains a discomforting relevance to legal science.”124 They were not concerned with
the purpose of the parties themselves; their focus was on damage rules that could be
imposed on parties. Here, the end to which the activity is directed is the end of the
parties (sophisticated parties, to be sure), not the doctrinalists. Their “end” is to
balance the reliance against other factors—adaptation to change, juridical risk,
allocating responsibility for controlling costs, and so forth. How, if at all, they would
protect their reliance is a matter of contract design. The insights from considering
the design problem should, in turn, influence the development of doctrine.
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